

21 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Members of State-Defense-CIA Study
Group on the Middle East, 20 April 1967

PRESENT: [] and Members of the Study Group 25X1A

1. This meeting was held, at the request of the DDI, to attempt to get a better sense of what the Study Group was trying to do and what they would expect from CIA. After a one hour luncheon conversation and a one hour discussion following, [] and I both were impressed that the Group had no clearer idea of their objectives now than they revealed in their Planning Memorandum No. 2, dated 3 April. Most of the members did not appear to be familiar enough with the economies of the Middle East countries to have precise ideas about what an economic annex to their study should contain. At the request of several members, I offered to see if a packet of helpful materials could be collected for their use. (If so, I will give it to [] for transmittal.) 25X1A

2. [] and I both stressed that the disparate nature of the area encompassed in their study presented problems in trying to generalize on trends and prospects. The group hastened to agree, but expressed the hope that contributions would rise above individual country or sub-group observations whenever possible. 25X1A

3. Some comments by members of the group suggested that considerable detail might be expected on such things as agrarian patterns, soil and water, and prospects for technological progress in the area during the next ten years. I pointed out that we have only half a dozen or so economic analysts assigned to follow the entire area of their study and that these persons are heavily committed to NIE and NIS work as well as policy support and that consequently their expertise was not very deep on some aspects of these economies. The group stated that they probably would be satisfied with less detail than some of their working notes might imply. Nevertheless, they observed that Ambassador Holmes was much impressed with the importance of

technology to the area and that they would want an annex on technology from the DD/S&T. [] is writing a memo to the DDI on our meeting and will inform him of this.

25X1A

4. The group indicated that Ambassador Holmes hoped that by 28 April firm requests could be sent to contributors and that the study could be completed by 15 or 30 July, but they thought September or October would be more realistic. I stated that the economic annexes quite likely could take 2 months to complete.

25X1A



21 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM :

:

SUBJECT :

: Julius Holmes Study Group

25X1

1. On 20 April [] assistant [] and I visited the Julius Holmes Study Group and discussed its proposed requirements levied on CIA.

25X1A
25X1A

2. The group is comfortably ensconced in a suite of rooms in the JCS area complete with conference rooms and bathboy to keep the coffee urns filled and a supply of clean coffee cups on hand.

STATOTHR

ATOTHR

3. July 15 is the presumed target date of the study, but the group's members admit that September or October are more realistic. Around 28 April Holmes plans to present target dates for inputs to the Senior Group.

4. I gave the group's members []

STATOTHR

ATOTHR

[] a rundown on ORR's methods and manner of operations, stressing that lengthy studies simply could not be produced within the group's time span and that it would have to be satisfied with fairly brief essays. [] emphasized this point and attempted to get them to focus on specific questions and reasonable requests. He stated that it would take ORR about 2 months to produce the requested data in essay form.

25X1A

5. Discussion was carried out with regard to the questions on technological changes. It seems to me that queries of this sort will have to be handed by D.D.S. and T.

6. Our general impression of the group is that it is still floundering around not knowing exactly yet what it wants. Its heavy legacy in thought and personnel from the Chinese Study is a disadvantage. We pointed out the absolute lack of homogeneity in the Area studied.

7. The Study now is projected 10 years ahead in many cases, not 5 years as originally envisioned.

8. Recommendations:

A. A control over the CIA input on the Communist Chinese aspect be instituted. At present [redacted] is producing a paper for the group, but no vetting process has been instituted to my knowledge.

25X1A

B. CIA representation on the group should be maintained in its present form until the study begins to take shape, then we should step in and actively participate. Drafts of certain aspects of the study are now being worked up by the group. Frankly, I think that another presence would be a waste of time; the group simply is not proceeding rapidly enough to warrant another person. I do feel, however, that more forceful and authoritative CIA representation will be necessary later on.

STATOTH

C. I suggest that the CIS Alternate touch base with the group on a regular basis to keep up with its thinking, progress, and personnel. The same should be the case for a representative of ORR.

9. I came away with a feeling of dismay.

25X1A

25X1A

SECRET*File*

25X1A

SSDSG-006

17 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

25X1A

SUBJECT : Group's Thinking on Technological Developments in the Area.

1. Memoranda relating to Amb. Holmes' visits with AEC and the Scientific Advisor to the President were submitted principally to alert the Agency as to the trend of thinking which has pervaded the Group. There is perhaps a somewhat disproportionate reliance upon the miracle of technological development within the next decade which might so completely change the complexion of the area that conclusions reached today may not hold ten years hence. The meetings described have had a cooling effect but the underlying premise continues.

2. Not less than the technological progress of startling proportions in the development of the area, technology plays an important role in the effort to foresee the future of the great U.S. communications installations. Will Wheelus have to be vacated? What about Asmara? Landing rights? Overflights? Ability to deploy Military Task Forces wherever needed? Clearly, the thinking is not entirely technological, but is influenced by political considerations. In short, how U.S. interests will be affected when:

- a) Technology permits U.S. withdrawals;
- b) U.S. withdrawals become inevitable because of political pressures.

[REDACTED] 25X1A

SECRET

14 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

25X1A

SUBJECT: Meeting with the DD/I on Special State-Defense Study
on the Middle East, 13 April 1967

PRESENT: R.J. Smith, [REDACTED]

1. The DD/I announced that the State Defense Study Group was now the State-Defense-CIA Group, since the Director was participating at the top level and the DD/I was a member of the Senior Policy Group. In this connection, the DD/I alluded to the China study on which CIA had made a heavy input without having any control, except as coordinator, over the final product.

25X1A

2. The DD/I is thinking about appointing [REDACTED] as the DD/I monitor for the project. [REDACTED] fears being caught up in a morass of bureaucracy and paper-pushing, and doesn't quite know whether to be enthusiastic about this possible designation or to resist.

25X1A

3. [REDACTED] has visited the headquarters of the project at the Pentagon and is not much impressed so far. ORR will be asked to write annexes on "Economic Trends and Prospects" and "Petroleum". He said that in his view, the project managers did not really know what they wanted. I remarked that there was some evidence of this from the terms of reference passed out at the meeting (Planning Memorandum No. 2, Subject, "Initial Task Assignments," dated 3 April 1967). I commented particularly on the difficulty of writing on economic trends and prospects for a Middle Eastern area which was defined to include the Maghreb, the eastern Arab states, the south Arabian states, the Persian Gulf states, and the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, French Somaliland, Somalia, but not Kenya or Tanzania).

25X1A

4. [REDACTED] is apparently taking his usual attitude -- he wants to manipulate the mix of [REDACTED] participation and responsibility from time-to-time to suit himself. [REDACTED] also disapproves of the use of this group to make the study; he believes that studies of this kind should be accomplished through the IRG machinery, which he believes, according to [REDACTED] to be the wave of the future.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

APR 1967

5. The DD/I asked [] to visit the project managers once again and attempt to get a better sense of what they were after. Among other things, he is to arrange for a meeting with ORR, so that the ORR contribution can be discussed.

25X1A

6. I have the following impression of the DD/I's position: he wants CIA to participate and is pleased that this participation now includes membership in the control groups. At the same time, the study is not one which the DD/I himself would have recommended undertaking, or which he feels will be terribly useful. In short, the DD/I appears to be accepting the project as a fait accompli; CIA participation is necessary to assure a good job and some CIA voice in determining the shape of the final product.

[]
25X1A

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS		
1	Acting D/RR	17 Apr	E L R		
2	D/RR				
3					
4					
5					
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks:					
25X1					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.				DATE	
				14 Apr 67	